

JPRS 81505

11 August 1982

Korean Affairs Report

No. 232

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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CONTENTS

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

'VRPR' Calls U.S. Envoy 'Colonial Governor' (Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, 23 Jul 82)	1
'VRPR' Scoffs at Chon's Comments on Independence (Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, 24 Jul 82)	6
'VRPR' Reports on Anti-U.S. Anti-Chon Leaflets (Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, 26 Jul 82)	8
Briefs Anti-U.S. Leaflets	10

SOUTH KOREA

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Curb on Unofficial Channels of Words Urged (TONG-A ILBO, 19 Jul 82)	11
--	----

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Professors Voice Perception of United States (SINTONG-A, Jun 82)	13
Paper Criticizes Japanese Distortion of History (KYONGHYANG SINMUN, 23 Jul 82)	29
Japanese Official Cited on History Books (CHOSON ILBO, 23 Jul 82)	30

Briefs

Japanese Textbook Issue	32
Japanese Loan Reply	32
Japanese on Loan Issue	33
Meeting With Socialist Leader	33

INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY

PRC Nuclear War Potential Viewed (Editorial; TONG-A ILBO, 19 Jul 82)	34
---	----

NORTH KOREA

ECONOMY

Soviet Aid to North Korea Reported (NAEWOE PRESS, 25 Jun 82)	36
---	----

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

'VR.R' CALLS U.S. ENVOY 'COLONIAL GOVERNOR'

SK270958 (Clandestine) Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification
in Korean to South Korea 1000 GMT 23 Jul 82

[Talk from the feature "Today's Feature"--"Colonial Governor Using the Name
Ambassador" by announcer (Ko Hui-chol)]

[Text] Pretending the government of the so-called Republic of Korea is an independent nation, the United States has been practicing a colonial rule there. The United States is the colony's Suzerain country controlling the drafting of all policies of the ROK Government. The U.S. ambassador to the ROK is the on-the-spot wire-puller of the ROK and a governor of neocolonialism who watches and supervises the execution of colonialism.

It is not by chance that the South Korean rulers have all been accustomed to the habit of watching the mood of the U.S. ambassador living in Chong-dong in Seoul. This is because the U.S. ambassador to the ROK always watches and supervises the South Korean rulers whether they remain thoroughly anticommunist, loyal to the directives from the White House and the Pentagon or whether they are obedient to his orders and directives.

If the stooges run counter to these or are deemed to be no longer exploitable, the U.S. ambassador sacks them at any time he pleases. So the South Korean rulers have been sounding out the mood of the U.S. Ambassador to the ROK and the White House, trying to remain in his favor.

During his tenure, Syngman Rhee, in an effort to endear himself to the United States, dispatched special envoys one after another. Arriving in the United States, the special envoys used to gush over how good Syngman Rhee was to U.S. political leaders. Among the secret special envoys who often met with MacArthur and Eisenhower to enumerate the good points of Syngman Rhee were women such as Mo Yun-suk and Kim Hwal-lan. They delivered Syngman Rhee's letters pledging loyalty to the United States and praised Syngman Rhee in a feminine way.

By winning the favor of the United States, Syngman Rhee could stay in the presidential office for three terms. Confused as to how to control the 19 April popular uprising, the United States ousted Syngman Rhee from presidential office.

The same thing happened to Pak Chong-hui. With a plan to practice military rule by a coup d'etat in the event Syngman Rhee's party politics failed, ever since the nation's liberation the United States had chosen Pak Chong-hui, Kim Chong-pil and Chang Tae-hwa and others to take over and employed them as secret intelligence agents, training them as stooges.

Following the 19 April uprising and Syngman Rhee's downfall, the United States sensed that South Korea, its colony, was in danger of slipping out of its hands as the anti-dictatorial spirit aspiring reunification grew. The United States, losing no time, instructed the Pak Chong-hui ring to stage a military coup d'etat and practice military rule in South Korea.

Allen Dulles, the U.S. CIA director who directly organized and directed this coup d'etat, unabashedly boasted that he had fabricated Pak Chong-hui's fascist military regime through (Whitaker) and Colonel Col. Cole, who were in charge of the station in Seoul.

Boasting that the South Korean military revolution had been the most successful in the U.S. CIA overseas activity during his tenure, he also said that South Korea would have been lost if the United States stood with folded arms and watched the developments in South Korea.

It was the United States that backed Pak Chong-hui, who succeeded in his military coup d'etat, to run for a third presidential term. It was also the United States that backed Pak Chong-hui in entrenching himself in office through the October Yusin system. Unable to suppress his gratitude toward the United States, Pak Chong-hui pledged he would modernize South Korea and make it a bulwark for the United States.

It was the United States which compelled Pak Chong-hui to accept the North-North dialogue. It was also the United States which made Pak Chong-hui issue the 23 June splittist statement, eventually driving him to perpetuate division and fabricate two Koreas.

In the end, when the United States felt that Pak Chong-hui, its stooge, had served his purpose and following the people's rejection and opposition to him, the United States eradicated him through mobilization of an intelligence network.

Chon Tu-hwan's case is no exception. As is well known, Chon Tu-hwan is a pro-U.S. stooge who was educated at U.S. military schools.

While trying to bring the situation developed by Pak Chong-hui's death under control by using Choe Kyu-ha, the United States was pushing ahead with a plan to put Chon Tu-hwan in power from behind the scenes. When Chon Tu-hwan staged a coup d'etat to purify the military, the United States even placed under Chon's direction three divisions of the armed forces: the 9th Division, the 20th Division and the Special Warfare Group, all of which were under South Korea-U.S. combined forces command and were deployed on the fronts with dozens of tanks and armored personnel carriers.

The United States masterminded the 17 May violence which directly provoked the bloody Kwangju incident. Former U.S. ambassador to South Korea Gleysteen admitted that he had approved all the schedules starting with the proclamation of martial law. He said the United States had already approved expanding and strengthening martial law throughout the nation. On this point, Chon Tu-hwan himself admitted that he had reported to the United States on this and had gotten approval for it even before expanding the martial law throughout the nation.

The United States assisted Chon Tu-hwan in winning the presidential election, hoping that South Korea, a U.S. colony, would remain in peace. However, it is too clear that Chon Tu-hwan's fate will not be different from Pak Chong-hui's.

The midwife for South Korean presidents is none other than the United States and the U.S. ambassador to Seoul is the wire-puller and supervisor of the South Korean presidents. The U.S. Government assigns the U.S. ambassador to the ROK the duty of controlling and supervising the thorough implementation of U.S. policy and demands in its colony, South Korea. In other words, the U.S. ambassador to the ROK is a modern version of a governor. As wire-puller for the marionette named the ROK, the U.S. ambassador has unlimited power in South Korea.

Now I am going to point out how much power the U.S. ambassador really wields by reviewing several examples:

Shocked by the demonstrations generated by the 15 March rigged elections, the U.S. ambassador to the ROK asked the home government what to do to bring the situation under control. Herter, the then U.S. secretary of state, instructed McConaughy, U.S. ambassador to the ROK, to force Syngman Rhee to resign and appease the public. At Kyongmudae [now Chongwadae], Ambassador McConaughy told Syngman Rhee that the United States could no longer support Syngman Rhee. He then summoned to the ambassadorial residence in Chong-dong National Defense Minister Kim Chong-yol, army chief of staff Song Yo-chan, Ho Chong, Pak Chan-il and presidential secretaries and handed them a plan to bring the situation under control, saying simply, "You just do what this plan says."

The plan aimed at restoring the situation included an 8-point set of instructions such as reelection and revived publication of the KYONGHYANG SINMUN. Again early in 1962 when the military regime faced a crisis because of a split in the mainstream faction, the U.S. ambassador instructed Pak Chong-hui to bring the situation under control by issuing the 27 February statement pledging that the military regime would not participate in the civilian government. Still, realizing that Pak Chong-hui was unable to stem the deterioration of the situation, he had Pak Chong-hui change his mind toward prolonging the military rule. The result was the statement issued on 16 March in which Pak Chong-hui revealed that he had changed his mind and military rule would continue.

On the evening of 15 March, Berger, U.S. ambassador to the ROK, summoned Pak Chong-hui and Kim Hyon-chol to the ambassador's residence and handed them a draft statement that said Pak Chong-hui was prolonging the military rule, instructing them to publicize the statement the next morning.

Thus, the U.S. ambassador not only controls the South Korean President but also supervises and controls the planning and execution of the basic policy of the South Korean Government.

The U.S. ambassador controls all policies of the South Korean Government in the political, economic, military, diplomatic and cultural fields.

On 17 August 1964 the U.S. ambassador, Brown, called on Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won and instructed him to conclude the South Korea-Japan talks within the year at any cost. At the same time, Brown handed Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won a U.S. memorandum calling for the sending of South Korean troops to Vietnam and instructed him about detailed plans which the South Korean Government should establish. This is what is known as the Brown memorandum which consisted of 14 articles.

Thus, following U.S. instructions, the Pak Chong-hui clique not only accelerated the South Korea-Japan talks despite the strong opposition of the nation, finally concluded the treasonous agreement with Japan, but also decided to send troops to Vietnam by anomalously passing the bill on the issue at the National Assembly.

The U.S. ambassador to South Korea also grasps the right of personnel management of the South Korean Government and directly appoints the cabinet members and other high-ranking officials.

As a result, in coming to power, the rulers of South Korea are not selected and appointed by public opinion but are chosen by the U.S. ruling circles, whose will is executed by the U.S. ambassador to South Korea.

On the other hand, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea has sent the sons of pro-U.S. stooges and pro-U.S. intellectuals to the United States and has implanted the pro-U.S. and anticommunist ideology among them. Thus, he has fostered even the reserve cadres of the puppets.

The U.S. ambassador to South Korea has been more firmly grasping and controlling the South Korean Government by thoroughly supervising the implementation of various agreements, treaties and memorandums concluded with South Korea.

This is why even the British newspaper EASTERN WORLD once criticized that the U.S. ambassador to South Korea is the governor-general of a colony enjoying the strongest power in South Korea.

The function of the U.S. ambassador to South Korea as a governor-general relies first of all on the armed force of the U.S. troops in South Korea. The U.S. forces in South Korea, the U.S. military advisory group and other U.S. intelligence organs [words indistinct] powerful backup of the U.S. Embassy in South Korea.

Taking advantage of U.S. aid and cooperation to South Korea, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea is enjoying the special privileges of extraterritorial rights and is performing the function as a governor-general in South Korea. The U.S. ambassador has been able to more easily perform the function as a governor-general because of the support of such South Korean privileged circles as the reactionary bureaucrats, comprador capitalists and landowners.

Thus, the United States has established a colonial regime in South Korea and has been ruling South Korea in the backstage of this regime.

As mentioned so far, the South Korean president is a puppet holding no power and is like the emperor of the defunct state of Manchuria.

The real power man in this land is the U.S. ambassador who is the representative plenipotentiary of the United States.

It is an out-and-out lie that the South Korean rulers are talking about sovereign state and independence. South Korea is an out-and-out colony of the United States.

CSO: 4108/207

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

'VRPR' SCOFFS AT CHON'S COMMENTS ON INDEPENDENCE

SK281314 (Clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification in Korean to South Korea 1000 GMT 24 Jul 82

[From the feature "Hour for Compatriots Abroad"--talk "A Short Study of Independence [Chajusong]"

[Text] Recently, the government and ruling party have often mentioned the word "independence." The word independence is mentioned when they advertise the politics of the so-called fifth republic or when they rave about the trend of the times. They too seem to know how good the word independence is.

When we say independence, it means a nature that tries to unfetter from all forms of enslavement and restraint and solve all problems on its own without depending on others. The word independence, often raved by Chongwadae, however, is nothing but nonsense. It is so because the word independence raved by them is no more than a slogan, entirely separated from reality and a meaningless word written on paper.

In view of our times, independence is a part of human nature which resists all forms of enslavement and constraints, steers its fate with its own hands as the master of nature and society and lives on its own. For the human as social beings, [as printed] this nature could be more valuable than their physical life. Since this is human nature and a nation is a group of human beings, independence is as precious as life itself. Although a human being breathes, he is just alive if he has no (?social relations). The same could be true of the nation; that is, if the nation does not have self-determination over its own fate, it inevitably becomes a slave to others.

This is true of a state. A state becomes a true state when it possesses sovereignty. The name of a state and government alone do not make a state in the true meaning of the word. If a state lacks political independence and is controlled by the pressures and intervention of outside forces, it cannot be said to be a truly independent state.

A country with no sovereignty that is subjugated to another country is called a colonial country. The government of such a country is called a puppet regime. Independence is a symbol of a sovereign country and a lifeline for its people.

When we have a close look at today's South Korean politics and South Korean Government in this context, we cannot help but scoff at the rulers' raving about independence. It is because the South Korean Government exists only in name. In reality, however, it is a puppet regime controlled by the U.S. baton. Although South Korea has an administrative branch, it cannot even set up a budget on its own without prior consent from the United States. In the constitution, the prerogative of supreme command is invested in the president, but, without approval from the United States, neither organization, movements nor personnel administration of the military can be handled by the South Korean armed forces. How can we call such a puppet government an independent government?

It is no secret that South Korean presidents are chosen by the United States and South Korea's domestic and foreign policy are enacted in conformity with U.S. will and in the interest of the United States.

As long as the U.S. forcible occupation of South Korea and its colonial rule there continue and as long as pro-U.S. flunkeyist, traitorous groups that are pursuing their own interests and trying to entrench themselves in office by spinging off the United States remain in this land, there is no independence in South Korea.

Our people's sovereignty is trampled upon by U.S. domination, because we failed to have an independent government. Our masses can regain independence, enjoy democracy and achieve peaceful reunification only when they overthrow the dictatorial Chon Tu-hwan regime--a subjugated regime that depends on outside forces--and establish an independent government on its grave.

The realization of independence cannot be donated by somebody, nor can it be achieved on its own. Only when all the masses struggle in unity under the banner of the anti-U.S. struggle for independence can they hasten the new dawn of independence, sovereignty and democracy.

CSO: 4108/207

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

'VRPR' REPORTS ON ANTI-U.S. ANTI-CHON LEAFLETS

SK270230 (Clandestine) Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification in Korean to South Korea 1000 GMT 26 Jul 82

[Text] According to a report from the Pusan branch organization of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, many anti-U.S. and anti-Chon Tu-hwan leaflets and posters were discovered in many places in Pusan recently.

The leaflets in the name of the Democratic Students Comradeship Association scattered recently near Pusan University condemned the fascist authorities' trials of the arsonists of the U.S. cultural centers in Pusan and Kwangju and strongly demanded that they are immediately released.

The leaflets read as follows: Fellow students! Should you just look at the fascists' vicious atrocities idly? The arson at the U.S. cultural centers was the sacred fire of patriotism. It is the United States and the present fascist regime who should be put on trial.

Fellow students! Let us devote ourselves unstintingly to the demands of history and the nation. Let us throw off terror and speak for the sufferings of the popular masses. Let us smash repression and achieve national sovereignty.

The leaflets with the title of "True Nature Cannot Be Concealed" scattered earlier in the area of Taeki-dong, Chung-ku, Pusan, condemned the illegality of the U.S. occupation of South Korea and demanded that it immediately withdraw from South Korea.

The leaflets read as follows: The United States is an aggressor and plunderer. This is the firm recognition, indictment and assertion of our popular masses. The mask of supporter and liberator which the United States has used as a disguising tool will no longer fool anyone.

The time has already passed when it was possible to occupy this land in the name of liberator and to subjugate South Korea in the name of aid. We will not be deceived any more. The United States should get out immediately.

The posters discovered in the area of Myongyun-dong, Tongnae-ku, Pusan, read as follows: The United States is our enemy. Let all of us rise up in the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle to build a South Korea devoid of yankees. Walker and Sennewald should go back, taking along all U.S. forces and nuclear weapons. Let us overthrow the traitorous Chon Tu-hwan clique.

Besides these leaflets and posters, many anti-U.S. and antigovernment leaflets and posters were discovered in many other places of the city.

CSO: 4108/207

INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ANTI-U.S. LEAFLETS--In recent days, an anti-U.S. leaflet has been posted again on the street in front of the Hanguk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul. The leaflet, which has been posted on a billboard at a corner on the street in front of the Hanguk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul in the name of Chiut Mium Hiut [the ninth, fifth and 14th consonants in the Korean alphabet]--which means the Society for Independence and Democracy [Chaju Minju Hoe]--reads as follows: The United States is our enemy. Why does not Walker go away? They are all the same. Sennewald should go away too. We want South Korea without yankees. Punish the traitor. [signed] Chiut Mium Hiut. [Text] [SK280348 (Clandestine) Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification in Korean to South Korea 1000 GMT 27 Jul 82]

CSO: 4108/207

S. KOREA/SOCIAL CONDITIONS

CURB ON UNOFFICIAL CHANNELS OF WORDS URGED

SK221247 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 19 Jul 82 p 1

[Column: "Gibberish"]

[Excerpts] It is the season of summer holidays for students and adults with various kinds of jobs, when the movement of the population occurs.

Because our society is an open one, we are not restricted at all in going on holiday journeys. Furthermore, thanks to the developed traffic network, the whole of the country has become a zone of life in which we are able to do business or something else in a day and, in its aftermath, the movement of the population has been on the increase. In other words, the traveling population has been drastically increasing. Therefore, also increasing are the personal contacts and the dialogues between private persons. Owing to the development of the ultra-speedy mass transportation means, the international comings and goings of people are increasing day by day.

Thus, sometimes people in Los Angeles or in Paris are informed of a news report about Seoul far in advance of Seoulites. This is because of mouth-to-mouth personal communications. Moreover, we have many kinds of get-togethers. We have numerous sorts of leisure-seeking meetings such as private loan club meetings, social meetings, alumni reunions, reunions of classmates who have graduated from the same classes or schools, meetings of people who have hailed from the same counties, meetings of people who have the same family line, anglers' club and mountain climbers' clubs. And there are numerous kinds of seminars. All that matters is that these get-togethers are concurrently playing an unofficial role of channels of communication among private persons.

Such unofficial mouth-to-mouth communication channels are interwound through our day-to-day lives like cobwebs. In an open society, we cannot regulate numerous comings and goings of our modern people nor can we do away with the memories of the numerous get-togethers. Nor need we do so. By the way, the more the public masses are coming to distrust the mass communication media, the more they will come to lay trust in these private communications networks, and the more the serviceableness of these networks will grow. We experienced this phenomenon in the past.

We see today that the words "to gather public opinion" have come into fashion. The expression "gathering public opinion" appears everywhere in remarks by politicians or in the writings of writers. However, in gathering correct public opinion, the people's trust should be, above all, placed further in the mass communication media. Doing so is also the way to curb the unofficial communication channels.

CSO: 4108/203

PROFESSORS VOICE PERCEPTION OF UNITED STATES

Seoul SINTONG-A in Korean Jun 82 pp 156-170

[Roundtable discussion among a group of college professors held in Seoul on 30 April 1982: "Is It Anti-America or Pro-America?"]

[Participants: Father Paek Min-kwan, professor, Catholic University; Im Hui-sop, sociology professor, Korea University; Han Sung-su, economics professor, Seoul National University; Ham Pyong-ch'un, law professor, Yonsei University; No Chae-pong (moderator), sociology professor, Seoul National University]

[Text] Moderator: Thank you very much for coming when you are busy. Not only does this historic year mark the 100th anniversary of the opening of relations between Korea and the United States, but it seems that lately interest in the United States has been growing anew with such activities as the Pusan United States Information Service arson incident and the pronouncements of the Korean Church Social Mission Association. Thus, in certain circles the words "pro-America" and "anti-America" crop up frequently, but today it would seem a good idea if we laid out our current point of view of the United States while examining the historical background of Korean-United States relations. First, I thought we could carry on our discussion by concretely examining our various problems with the United States while determining how the attitude of Koreans toward the outside world has generally been formed. To begin with, Professor Ham who has had experience in America as our ambassador....

Ham: I think that the way Koreans see the outside world, or the international scene, is closely related to the geographical situation of the Korean peninsula. One hundred years ago a fierce struggle ensued between our powerful neighbors, i.e., China, Russia, and Japan, to control the Korean peninsula. The problem in the process of struggle was the fact that in both the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War the Korean peninsula became a battlefield. Therefore the ones to bleed, to suffer pain were our people. At first our ancestors tried to avoid this by a closed-door policy, which didn't work out. That is, at the time they wanted to establish internationally that the Kingdom of Choson was clearly an entity separate from China, Russia, or Japan, as well as that the Korean peninsula should not become a battlefield for the great powers.

These were the methods we chose at that time. One was announcing neutrality. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War we declared ourselves a permanent neutral nation, but it didn't help. Another method was to drag in the United States. At first we had no ideas about involving the United States; it was the recommendation of the Chinese Li Hung-chang. Initially our court resisted the idea, but finally we had no choice but to establish relations with the United States. Most of the Korean-American Treaty of Friendship signed with American Admiral Schufeldt was negotiated between Li Hung-chang and the Americans, with our representatives going to Inch'on for the formal signing. However, the first article of the Korean-American Friendship Treaty could easily be misunderstood as a promise by the United States to guarantee our country's sovereignty and independence by force if necessary, and in fact at the time we saw the United States differently from China or Japan. The reasons why we saw the United States differently and brought that country into the Korean peninsula were: first, unlike our neighbors the United States had no direct ambitions in the Korean peninsula; second, the United States was one of the world's great powers; third, the United States was geographically distant; and fourth, the United States was situated on the Pacific Ocean.

Thus we tried to achieve the two goals I just mentioned by using America's influence. However, the American attitude at that time was one of noninvolvement in the struggles of the powers over the Korean peninsula; the United States later went so far as to sign a secret pact with Japan, after the Japanese defeated Russia, by which the United States would agree to Japanese rule in Korea in return for Japanese abandonment of its ambitions in the Philippines.

As we began relations with the United States, many American diplomats, advisers, missionaries, and teachers came to Korea, and they gave sympathy and aid to Koreans. However, even though the Americans we dealt with directly were very friendly, that had nothing to do with their country's policy.

At any rate, we hoped for great help from the United States, but in the end we were disappointed. At the same time our view of the United States seems to have been determined greatly by the fact that our country was a fellow Asian country, Japan's colony, not a colony of a Western country, and by the fact that when we were under Japanese colonial rule the only foreigners to help and sympathize with our country's independence were Americans.

Also, although there is of course the problem of North-South division, it was the United States that played the decisive role in our liberation from the Japanese in 1945, and when our nation was in difficult straits due to the Korean War the United States helped in many ways; I think that our people's view of the United States has been formed by a combination of these various things.

Moderator: Professor Ham has discussed the historical context of the image Koreans have of the United States; keeping this historical background in mind, Father Paek, please discuss the spiritual attitude of Koreans when they view the outside.

Paek: Frankly I do not know much about the United States. Reflecting back on the relationship of our Catholic Church with the United States, it seems not so much a question of being anti-American as of there being a tendency to think that the Americans have not done much. This is because French missionaries were the first to come in and proselytize, so that the Catholic Church is known as the French church; also, the historical and cultural background of the Catholic Church is European rather than American. Most of the high clergy leading the church today were educated in Europe, and as you know Europeans have a tendency to look down on Americans.

Although we Koreans historically have very close ties with the United States, from the church's point of view such is not the case. For example, at the time the Taewon-gun called the Catholic Church and Westerners foreign barbarians and persecuted them, the Americans had nothing to do with our church. Thus as far as the Catholic Church is concerned, since the persecutions began the Americans have not helped the church nor aided its development.

By contrast, as soon as they came in the Protestant missionaries built schools, introduced sports and established colleges; haven't nearly all of our country's leaders received education in the Protestant system?

The situation now is that although the French first came in to proselytize, as far as the church is concerned because they only carried out rural proselytizing and did little to develop talent before liberation, the Catholic Church only began to develop after it was in our own hands. Thus from the Catholic point of view, the Americans are seen as just a friendly nation. Lately a clamor has been made about anti-American slogans, but it is nothing for such talk to come from Catholics. As I said a little while ago, because as Catholics we have no special relations with the United States, from time to time we may criticize the Americans, but considering our country's situation we have a comparatively solid attitude, treating the United States as a friend.

A moment ago you spoke of mental attitudes; I think our situation is very difficult because although we use the term "we" a lot around the world in fact we don't seem to have one well-established intellectual mainstay. Confucian culture is collapsing and Buddhist culture, although deeply rooted, does not penetrate the minds of the masses. We have a Christian culture, but it still lacks the strength to step forth and lead the masses.

One thing to recognize is that even though we often criticize the influence of Americans on our country, when we think coolly we recognize that we have adopted the Americans' feeling for justice and their spirit of freedom and we have been influenced greatly by them. Thus I think that when looking for a spiritual mainstay, instead of limiting ourselves to some specific religion we need to go out into the world and take up the pan-religious spiritual heritage of mankind.

Moderator: The important thing you have just said is that the Catholics, unlike the Protestants, have never felt a close attachment to the United States, and that this difference can explain the recent series of incidents; this seems very important to me.

Im: Using the historical experience of our people discussed by Professor Han as background, if we simplify the way we have seen the world from the old Confucian world view to modern times, we should be able to gain several different points of view.

One is the idea that because we have always been confronted historically with the problem of survival, we have looked at outsiders in terms of enemy or comrade, enemy or friend, from the viewpoint of life or death. In this dichotomous view of the outside, the entity called America has been seen--at least from the people's point of view--as a close friend through the period of Japanese colonialism and the Korean War. However, this point of view seems to have caused a great deal of confusion as the Cold War era ended and the new world order of detente began. That is, we began to form a more complex view of the outside and began to realize that it was not so simple as the enemy/friend dichotomy.

Next, after the opening up of the country, as we began taking a progressive posture regarding national development and modernization, there came into being another view of the outside world. From the standpoint of whether other countries were ahead of us or behind us, we seem to have defined ourselves as late-developing. But this view also brought confusion with the acceleration in economic development of the 1960's. That is, we became aware that we were not necessarily a late-developing nation but rather a semideveloped or developing nation.

While pursuing development, we sought models in countries more advanced than ourselves; you could say that the United States was chosen as our model. This viewpoint taking the United States as a model has seemed to lead to a situation calling for reflection or readjustment since the time we began to think of ourselves as a developing country, since the increasingly complex world order saw the appearance of the so-called Third World, and since we began to develop an interest in such issues as the North-South problem or the question of dependency.

Moderator: That is very interesting. Professor Im has explained sociologically the Koreans' view of the outside world; Professor Han, please tell us how the Koreans' view of the outside world has been formed from an economic perspective.

Han: Looking at Korean-American relations since the Korean War, we can discover a very interesting fact. Beginning with the pushing of the so-called overseas-oriented development strategy in the early 1960's, our economy has been internationalized; during the process, not only did our capital borrowing and exports, which at first had been concentrated in a few countries, continuously expand to other countries, but by the 1970's we were sending a lot of manpower overseas.

I think that these changes in economic conditions greatly influence the way our people see the outside world. This, of course, includes the United States. I think that 200 or 300 years from now, when people write our country's history, they will consider the most crucial fact of the latter half

of the 20th century to be our entry into the Middle East, not our relations with America. It is in this sense that the 9th century activities of the Wan Island-based Chang Po-ko in the South China Sea are appraised highly; if you consider that recently as many as 300,000 to 400,000 Koreans a year have been going back and forth to the Middle East, you can imagine that because so many people are going not only to America but to many countries where they make contact with many different cultures, the way in which we view the world is changing in many ways.

From the American point of view, World War II was the high point when it had virtually absolute power in world politics, but beginning in the 1970's America's relative economic, political, and military power has decreased.

In this sense, it seems that in this situation where we are expanding while America is undergoing a relative decrease in power, a structural change in the relationship between the two countries has occurred.

When we were saying "economy first," there was much we could learn from America. We could use the United States as a model for development under the goal of living well. But as we passed beyond the one-sided economic approach and began to recognize the importance of social development and spiritual culture, we began to doubt if we really had anything to learn from America.

In this sense there are some who have feelings that can perhaps be described as animosity toward people who have studied in the United States. That is, they are asking if American style studies, American style models can be applied to our society. A little while ago Father Paek said that America can be a friend but it can also be criticized; I wonder if we are changing our opinions of America and are trying to establish a new posture on a different level because the very way itself in which we view America has changed over the last 30 years.

In short, I wonder if Korean-American relations have not reached a turning point not only in economics but across the full range, including political, social, and military aspects.

Moderator: To summarize what you four gentlemen have said thus far, starting from the historical occasion when we could have good feelings toward America, our feelings have slowly changed over a long period to reach a turning point today. This seems to be a very important observation, and looking at this conclusion I have a thought. That is, what you four have said can be seen as the view of professionals, of the highest elite; I wonder how it is from the viewpoint of the masses. I think that perhaps the image of America held by the masses is influenced by the elite, by the mass media, and by the government. Please discuss this issue.

Im: I think there have been several ways by which we have had contact with the United States. From the late Yi dynasty through the period of Japanese imperialism we had contact mainly through the Protestant church, and when the American military came in after liberation, I believe there was a lot of contact in the civilian sphere as well. Next, the members of our elite studied

in America and came back to become very active in various fields, such as politics, the economy, and religion, although the Catholics may be an exception.

The next important thing is our contact with America through the mass media and the recent emigration of many people to the United States, so that many common people now have direct contact with America. Because our image of America was formed through such varied ways of contact, it is hard to speak simply.

First, however, the image, generally expressed, that the masses have of America via the United States military and the mass media seems to be that the United States is a wealthy country, a democratic country, a country where science and technology are highly developed, and a country that gives us a great deal of aid.

But America's image is not necessarily good only. The image also seems to include materialism and decadence along with wastefulness and excessive freedom.

Moderator: Professor Han, during your stay as ambassador to the United States, you must have seen with your own eyes how Korean journalism and other channels formed an image of America; is there anything special that you felt?

Han: There are aspects in which the way we now see America has grown quite sophisticated, but the surprising thing is that when you look closely at what our journalists report, it seems that they do not try enough to see America's problems from a Korean point of view, that is, from the side that strives to see our country's interests. For example, when our journalists go to America and write articles, they somehow feel that it is impolite to write about America's dark side. But if the United States sets its national interests ahead of ours, our journalists become sulky as if they were greatly disappointed. Even in the case of the rice problem, they say things like how can Americans try to sell rice to us at such a high price, or how can the people who used to give us rice now behave this way. However, seen another way, we export to America as well, so it appears that our journalists need a somewhat broader view.

Han: Even though our relations with the United States have changed a lot over a period of time, our feelings toward America have changed very little and seem likely to remain unchanged. For example, about 20 years ago a man I knew was going to Germany. When he went to the countryside to tell his relatives that he was going to Germany, the elders said that Germany was no good but America was. To me it seems that this way of thinking is still latent in our people.

We were speaking a moment ago about journalism, but it seems to me that there are many uneven aspects in all fields of our relations with America, including not only journalism, but also politics, economics, and culture. I don't know if it is because we are such a small country, but, for example, whereas

our newspapers print many good stories about America, their newspapers don't treat us that way. I was staying at the Brookings Institute for a month at the time of the Tong-sun Pak affair; the articles about our country were frightening.

Moderator: Isn't that because good things don't make particularly exciting news? (laughter)

Han: We have a tendency to try to see America in a good light; by contrast there seem to be very few Americans who know us. As a proportion of the population, the Americans who know us are a tiny minority, and most people make judgments about us with the fragmentary information they get from the media.

Thus one can think that the American perception of Korea is bad; the problem is that it is possible that this situation will continue. Thus the structural turning point in Korean-American relations at which I said we have arrived is an assessment of the material aspects; in terms of consciousness, most of our people must still be seen as not having discarded their expectations or their dependence on America.

Therefore, I am saying that a gap exists between our level of consciousness and our real situation, and I think that people in journalism and academia must do a lot in this area. Then when our perception of the United States and the current realities of Korean-American relations meet, those relations will be much better both spiritually and materially.

Paek: Toadyism is a word which is heard not infrequently in our society; it seems to me that the so-called "serve the great" ideas that our people have cannot necessarily be seen as bowing and scraping to large countries. Even in ancient times we were known as the Eastern Country of Etiquette, and it seems that whether it is Americans or, these days, Arabs, we have a tradition of treating foreigners with every courtesy, a tradition which seems to lend itself to toadyism in a peculiar way.

Even though people are always decrying toadyism, to me it doesn't seem to be something to be denounced that way. Our people just give of themselves. But when others don't reciprocate later on, we feel disappointed. Americans aid us economically, but we are strongly inclined to treat them with human feeling, whether you call it Confucianist or humanist, and there is a strong tendency for the two approaches not to fit.

Thus, as was said a bit ago, the pro-American view, or the tendency to see Americans favorably, is very widespread among the people; rather than eradicating this, I would prefer that it be revised.

In relation to the recent church, although the people of our church perhaps should not have caused repeated disturbances during the Pak regime and after, our young Catholic priests mostly belong to the post-liberation generation. As I said earlier, these are people who have actually experienced the development of our church without American involvement. Thus, although it may not

be clearly manifested, these young priests subconsciously have strong feelings or resistance to the situation in which our society supposedly cannot live economically, politically, or in any way without the United States. What they are saying is that we can do it ourselves; there isn't anything that we cannot do with our own hands. I may be going off on a tangent, but the ones who really bow and scrape before the Americans are the Japanese. Thus I think we need a somewhat self-possessed attitude toward the Americans.

Moderator: Up to this point, we have mostly discussed the United States in relation to our perceptions of the outside world, and we have had some good discussion on several points. Now it seems that we should determine how the American presence or American influence in Korea is shaping up. Professor Ham first....

Ham: I think that the United States is probably an absolutely necessary entity when considering the security of the Republic of Korea (ROK). I think that there is nothing shameful in saying so. This is because we are not the only nation that absolutely needs American military support for our security; in fact, in some ways Japan, Great Britain, and Germany are all in the same situation, and I don't think that there is any need to be embarrassed or feel servile out of some so-called nationalistic emotion.

The United States is a necessary entity for us, but because this necessity can be seen as a help to American national interests or worldwide strategic interests, it probably should be viewed on the level of mutual interests. However, if one forces the issue of whose need is more urgent, of course we need the United States more urgently.

Another thing we must consider is that among those of us who must coolly judge and evaluate all problems in our nation's relations with the United States, there are some who seem unable to do so. This is the personality problem Father Paek discussed a little earlier; our people place too much emphasis on feelings.

Therefore, we think less about results than about how, in the process of arriving at the results, the other person injured our feelings or did something that doesn't seem right. I may have said this sometime before, but when you start counting feelings in diplomacy, it's already too late.

Another thing is that international politics is a game played on a very unfeeling stage with completely different rules, but even so, our people have not yet fully grasped the rules of the game. Thus there is an aspect in which we, as a member of the international community, are not able to promote our national interests to the maximum. That is, when we discuss national interests with Westerners, we must assert rights as they always do.

We are inhibited by a feeling that if we assert our rights then others will assert their rights also to disrupt feelings on both sides, so we are unable to assert our rights. So I wish our media would provide some support in relation to this problem.

For example, in a case where a diplomat or a man handling foreign affairs is negotiating a problem with the United States, there are aspects which the Americans cannot judge well, such as whether this person is really a representative of Korean public opinion, whether he is somewhat anti-American or maybe just a little arrogant. At such a time, if our media were to discuss things well, the Americans could realize that our man is really the representative of public opinion, or is really asserting national interests. This is really true in international society. It is not just that he who sleeps on his rights gets no protection from the law--he is trampled under. So I think that in our relations with the United States, we should not base ourselves on circumstances but rather should have the attitude of determining issues by cool reason.

I have made my assumptions clear already, but using the United States as an example, there is no doubt that America is absolutely necessary to our security; but for that reason, if we want to maintain smooth relations with the United States, we must speak up forthrightly and demand logically what we must demand according to the rules of the game.

Moderator: You have just spoken of the United States as part of the total structure of Korean society; if security is seen as the most important problem, you said that the United States occupies a fundamental role in Korea's security and that this is necessary for our mutual interests. You also said that the United States now exists as a fundamental part of the ROK's defense capability; however, that does not mean that we must follow the United States unilaterally, but that even though as an identical international unit we clearly can deal on an equal basis, something is not right and that we have not fully grasped the rules of the international game.

What Professor Han has said is very good; seen from an economic perspective, please tell us objectively about the United States as part of the Korean economy.

Han: As I said earlier, our economic relations with the United States have, like other things, uneven aspects. As a simple example, in 1981 about 26 percent of our total exports went to the United States, but by contrast imports from us constituted only about 2 percent of America's total imports. Also, 23 percent of our imports came from the United States, whereas in comparison exports to us accounted for no more than about 2.6 percent of total U.S. exports.

Thus it is a comparative ratio of 23 or 24 to 2, so that whereas the United States has tremendous influence on us, we have only a slight influence on America. It was even worse in the past. And the United States has given us a great deal economically. Free aid alone probably totals about \$4.5 billion.

In that process our country's economic structure was not able to digest American aid and wasted it so that we were unable to develop a good industrial structure, but whether the responsibility lies with American aid or with our politicians of the time is not a problem to squabble about here.

However, if we consider what might have happened in those circumstances if we hadn't had the United States, we can say that America helped us materially in establishing our so-called economic foundation. But I think there is something more important than the material aspects. That is, by guaranteeing our security, the United States gave us the psychological security needed to develop our economy. The economy needs some future certainty in order to have investment, and investment is not something concerning 1 or 2 years, but rather something whose results continue for 10 or 20 years; because of the uncertainties rising out of our circumstances of national division, our country has a great disadvantage.

In this sense, it seems that the bulk of our people feel some degree of assurance in security aspects because the United States is here. Thus we gained the psychological security enabling us to develop economically, and I think that in the future also this factor will be a great help as our economy continues to expand.

Moderator: Thus the problem of security is involved as part of the economy as well. How do you feel, Father Paek, about the spiritual and religious position America occupies in Korea?

Paek: Actually, the Americans do not wield such great influence in spiritual and religious aspects. In comparison to the absolute necessity in politics and the economy, there seems to be something of a divergence here. In fact, most of our people who have studied in America and come back home have assumed leadership in technical fields.

They belong to such practical areas as politics, economics, and medicine; we just do not go to America for spiritual fields. Furthermore, there is not much reason for people from our church to go to the United States. Because of this situation, I really don't have too much to say on this aspect. We are different from the Protestant ministers. They must study in America to gain entry to the ranks of leadership here, but that is not the case with us. Thus, as I said, I don't have much to say about America.

Moderator: There must be much to say about social culture aspects.

Im: At any rate, there is no question but what American influence has predominated in both our elite culture and our mass culture. In the case of our elite culture, except as I said before for the Catholics (laughter), most academics have been educated in the United States, so they seem to have been influenced a lot by American culture.

As for our mass culture, since the elite members of mass culture such as movie producers have been influenced by America, I think that both our elite and our mass cultures alike have been very much influenced by American culture. But that cultural influence has been generally one-way, i.e., just as in the economy, it can be said that we are in a situation of receiving more than we give.

However, when considering the influence of American culture, it does not seem that it is a result of some sort of American cultural colonialism or the

result of some strong motivation for Americans to transmit their culture. If the situation was one where the United States had tremendous political or economic interests at stake, then cultural influence could become a means, but we are not in so important a position to the United States.

But I do think that there is the motive of trying to maintain pro-American feelings among our influential elite. And I think that there's nothing wrong with that from the standpoint of national interests.

Therefore, I think that the dominant influence of American culture is a matter of our own choice. What I am saying is that we can vary American cultural influence or we can decrease it.

Moderator: One questions what is happening to political culture. In some sense our political culture seems to be gradually moving away from that of America; Dr Ham, please discuss this in terms of legal sociology.

Ham: I see it this way. There are two or three things. First, as already mentioned, there seems to be a problem with the limitations deriving from the fact that our country is still in a war situation. Therefore, I think that although our people wish to put into practice America's representative or liberal democracy, these limitations are causing many problems.

Second, there are few examples of the transplanting of American political culture to other countries. For example, after World War II, Japan received a great deal of American influence. Looking closely, the Japanese have been more influenced by American culture than we have. But Japan's political culture is quite different from that of America.

Thus the question arises whether American political culture has even been transplanted to a foreign country. As for Central and South America, not only has the United States-style political order not been maintained, but that is the area which gave rise to the theory of Third World subordination. I think that there is virtually no place where American political culture has taken root.

Another problem is this. The pursuit of the common interests of the United States and our country can be seen as diplomacy; the difference or the estrangement between the two political cultures is in fact a very difficult problem in the pursuit of our common interests. This is the difficulty between Korea and the United States.

Therefore, the Americans now say that our common interests in security, strategy, and economics are important, but shouldn't the Koreans support America culturally, and particularly in political culture?

This is a particularly serious problem for those Americans known as liberals. Also, a little while ago I said that we are in a wartime situation; when we say this, our young people feel a strong resistance. They are asking why, when we say we will have American style democracy, it doesn't work out. This

remains an important element in the frustration and dissatisfaction of our young people, especially college students.

This is one of the most important tasks that the current administration has to solve.

Moderator: You have just said that although we are very much influenced by America in several ways, political culture is an exception, that even though we have close relations with the United States, we cannot approach American political culture, and that the reasons for this include the fact that the traditions of our political culture are totally different, the fact that we are in a wartime situation, and the fact that there are virtually no examples of success in transplanting the American political system in other places.

In fact, there is no new nation that does not hold itself up to be a democracy. What this means realistically is that in most cases authoritarian rulers use their pretensions to democracy to justify themselves.

Up to now we have talked mostly about how we, from our point of view, see America and about America's influence; I think maybe we should take a quick look at how, by contrast, America sees Korea.

Im: From the American point of view, Korea is probably not all that important politically, economically, or culturally. Therefore, what we expect from America and what America expects from us are naturally quite different, and this leads to difficulties between Korea and America. However, even though the United States helped us and sacrificed many men during the Korean War, it did not do so simply out of some spirit of international charity.

It had its convictions in American style democracy and I think that during the Cold War situation following World War II there were various demands from the American people and policymakers who were hoping that their political system and political culture could be transplanted to the new nations. I think that, considering these expectations, the political realities of Korea from the liberation up to now have not fulfilled the hopes of the American people but instead have caused a lot of frustration.

Therefore, I think that at least in this aspect the general trend of the American attitude and public opinion toward Korea has taken a generally negative form.

Paek: When Reagan was elected president, one elderly American professor I know said that the White House makes the man and that Reagan, too, will become famous. At that time I thought that democracy is really powerful, that no matter who is in charge of politics, they become institutionalized and come out all right. Even a peanut vendor can become president.

But while they themselves do it that way, in our country at least, whenever there is a change of government the Americans actually exert a lot of influence of various kinds and every time America seems to be looking for a leader among the Koreans.

They do not seem to think that we are a people who can do everything for ourselves. Thus they think that Korea needs a so-called man of leadership. This seems to be different from what we Koreans think. It's not that Koreans do not have a tendency to submit easily when a new leader appears, but these days our young students are not that way.

Thus nowadays no matter who the college president might be, the students of Seoul National University and most other colleges all carry on very well. I think that this is why such an attitude on America's part is galling to the students.

This belongs to the field of political science so I cannot speak with certainty, but I think that political culture is the product of spiritual culture. In our country's case, Dr Syngman Rhee was a man who studied in America, yet when he came back to Korea his political style was totally different. Also, although it may not have been true right after the Korean War, soon most of his staff were men who had studied in America, yet those men around him were the foundation of his long rule.

This was not what America wanted. Thus there arose questions as to whether the American political system could be transplanted to Korea or whether there was any instance of success in transplanting American political culture in any underdeveloped nation, and in this sense I think that perhaps it has not yet been successful in our country.

In some ways this makes me feel that perhaps America is not the political culture model that we need.

Moderator: That is very important. Professor Ham must have much to say about America....

Ham: What I have to say about America is as Father Paek said: Ultimately it seems to depend on us. For example, Japan has strange politics which perhaps should be called Japanese style democracy, but there is a serious question as to whether it is a democracy at all. Nonetheless, the Americans do not refuse to deal with Japan because its political form is not American style democracy.

So I think that there has to be a fundamental change in our current situation in order to have American style democracy. For example, we must eliminate emotionalism and we must eliminate much of our familism to become more individualist. And I think that in our daily speech we must eliminate many honorifics and change to more egalitarian speech. Of course, I am not saying that that is necessarily good.

At any rate, I think that there must be many preconditions to achieve American style democracy and whether we should submit to those preconditions, whether we should pursue them consciously, will be a problem.

Therefore, although it would be ideal to retain the good points of our family system, our interpersonal relations and our morality while adopting the

individualism-based American style democracy, I think that this is asking too much and is probably impossible in realistic terms.

There is not much for us to demand from the Americans, but there is one thing. Whether it is because they have a strong consciousness of America as the best, I don't know but the Americans really like people who fawn on them. Also, our people generally have no bad feelings about American missionaries and I have sometimes heard Americans say that they don't like to see those Koreans hovering around missionaries.

If there is something for us to demand of Americans in this regard, it is that they also have some interchange with Koreans who don't speak English, who haven't studied in the United States, and who have criticisms of America. That is, I wish they could discard their preconceptions and make a little better effort to understand Korea.

Moderator: Today's discussions have pointed out that our objective circumstances have now changed and thus our view of America has changed, and that there are promising aspects but that we must carry on with a resolute attitude.

If so, it seems that we need the capacity for self-regulation in order to maintain such a resolute attitude. Professor Im, please discuss first from a cultural perspective what our mass media must do in order to eradicate the less promising aspects of our social situation.

Im: Looking at the results of a survey of college students, they display a very eclectic response to American culture. That is, their response concerns what they should learn and what they should not learn from American culture; this indicates that even while our students and intelligentsia have accepted what they already have from American culture, they have greatly developed a consciousness of dealing with the problem self-dependently.

However, there are also problems in eclectically adopting foreign, and especially American, culture. Not only is American cultural influence one-sided, but we have no choice in the area of science and technology. But we do seem to be developing a consciousness of adopting not just unilaterally from America but also from multiple sources.

Moderator: In other words, are you saying that while it's all right to have the United States, the world's greatest power, as the standard, we should also be looking at other countries in similar situations to see what they are doing?

Im: I am saying let's do it eclectically. For another thing, the legitimacy of too many aspects of our culture have suffered from the inclusion of foreign cultures, including the American; thus if we adopt American culture from a foundation of the consciousness of preserving our own cultural legitimacy, I think we can adopt American culture with more independence than in the past.

Paek: A little while ago, Professor Ham said that certain conditions must exist for us to accept true democratic culture; I think that is very important. There is frequent talk these days about changes to achieve this acceptance, but our everyday way of living must be changed to a logical way.

Only thus can we judge what to choose when adopting American or Western European culture. But in order to change to a logical way of living, it appears that we must adopt individualism. That does not mean that we should pursue individualism at all costs, but we must understand the essence, the original intent of American individualism before we can adopt it.

At the same time, we must take issue with our familism. We are bogged down at the level where everything is done for the family and where the family is the standard of evaluation.

Moderator: The most urgent problem now facing us is the economy; what do we need to learn from America in the way of spiritual culture from the viewpoint of achieving a long-range solution to our economic problems?

Han: The individualism Father Paek has spoken of is considered rationalism in economics. The time when that rationalism takes root should be a turning point for our economy to surge ahead greatly. That is a certainty.

Ham: I think that the logical way of living mentioned by Father Paek or the rationalism mentioned by Professor Han are things that must quickly become part of the way Koreans see America.

Looking carefully at things, it seems that there is still a tendency for our cultural assessment or value system to keep trying to fit itself to the realities arising in the current international society. Thus I think that there is a danger that since we feel grateful to the Americans for helping us and follow their culture without reservation, once we take offence we may go to extremes.

The country known as America is not inhabited by angels but rather is a country where imperfect humans live; therefore, we must recognize that Americans, too, will have the selfishness of trying to promote their own interests to the maximum and that because their country is big they may display such behavior as, shall we say, big state-ism. Also, I am saying that international society is such that we are in tense confrontation as everyone strives to promote his own country's interests to the maximum so that when we are ultimately unable to do this because we lack the power, we must accept it as natural.

The American soldiers in Korea are here because their presence ultimately benefits the national interests of both America and Korea; we must transcend such interpretations as the one that says that their presence here is of no benefit to America, that says that they are in Korea at a loss to themselves, only to help us, just as we must transcend the opposite interpretation.

Therefore, it seems that in the future we will have to carry on our relations with the United States seeing that country a bit more realistically. We must coolly determine how much we need America and how much America can help us.

To me, the most important thing in Korean-American relations is the fact that the most difficult problems arise when we present ourselves emotionally. I think we can communicate well with them when we present ourselves coolly and rationally.

Moderator: In conclusion, since Korea has its own position and America has its position, Korea cannot try to become like America and America cannot try to fit Korea to its standards; instead, as independent entities we each need to foster the areas of common interest.

Therefore, it seems that for us the time has come to look at international relations from a mature point of view. The conclusion is that in order to do so, all the people, and the government too, must from now on come forth with a resolute attitude. Thank you very much for giving so much of your time.

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CSO: 4108/165

S. KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

PAPER CRITICIZES JAPANESE DISTORTION OF HISTORY

SK290835 Seoul KYONGHYANG SINMUN in Korean 23 Jul 82 p 1

[From the column "Cleanings"]

[Excerpts] In writing history, unless one overcomes the urge to distort the historical facts, defining historical truth becomes a harder task. In writing national history in particular, historians are more or less tempted to embellish the nation's past history with a selfish view. The more mythical history becomes, the deeper the historical truth hides behind the myth. We cannot do anything about it.

In the recently revised textbooks on Japan's history, the Japanese have distorted the historical facts, averting their eyes from the truth. Approved by the Japanese Ministry of Education, the history textbooks describe our 1 March movement as a riot, the forced worship at the Japanese Shinto shrines as "encouraged" and forced draft of the Korean people as voluntary draft, and many other distorted historical facts are to be found in them.

What is more surprising is that they, having kept silent over our outcry over the distortion of history since last spring, began to write in mass media that they should reconsider only when communist China and the Soviet Union lodged protests over the same thing.

Japan's attempt to distort the historical facts show that they lack the strong will not to repeat the wrongdoings of the past as aggressors or the will to repent their past. In this regard, the Japanese reacted only after big powers came up with protest, showing clearly the narrow-mindedness of the people of an island nation.

Frankly speaking, the younger generation in Japan should at least be taught true history. We do not bother ourselves about the older generation.

To do so is an absolutely necessary condition for a correct redefinition of the relations between Korea and Japan.

CSO: 4108/203

S. KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

JAPANESE OFFICIAL CITED ON HISTORY BOOKS

SK250213 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean 23 Jul 82 p 1

[Text] Tokyo, correspondent Yi To-hyong—On 22 July, the Japanese Government gave a noteworthy opinion by saying: In Korea under the Japanese colonial rule, Japan did not commandeer the Korean people in an arm-twisting fashion. They should be distinguished from the Chinese laborers who were coercively commandeered.

Meeting with the CHOSON ILBO reporter on the night of 22 July, the Japanese Education Ministry official in charge of textbook authorization, said this while discussing the pages concerning Korea within Japanese high school history books.

On the textbook description which said that the Korean people, unlike the Chinese, were not coercively commandeered for the war carried out by Japan, he said: 1) at that time, the Korean people had Japanese citizenship but the Chinese people were under the Japanese occupation; therefore, the legal status of the two countries' peoples was quite different. We went through legal formalities in commandeering the Koreans. In this regard, it is not proper to deal with the Korean and Chinese cases from the same standpoints.

2) During the war, the Korean laborers had been commandeered in different ways in different periods. He noted the following different forms: recruitment at applicants' free will from 1939 to 1942; arrangement by the government (which means an agency under then government-general) from 1942 to 1944; and the decree on drafting people, applied to Koreans too after 1944.

In this connection, the Japanese Government is, in the form of legalistic logic, quibbling that because the Korean laborers were commandeered through lawful formalities until 1944, it was not a coercion. However, this official added: after 1944, we, of course, coercively drafted the Koreans. And I admit that even before 1944, the Japanese Government might have, as a matter of fact, carried out an arm-twisting draft. I do not say that this fact should not be included in the compilation of the textbooks. He said his opinion is the Japanese Government's official opinion.

Nevertheless, he stresses that the cases of the Korean and Chinese people during the war should be distinguished from each other. He has said this as an authoritative interpretation clarifying an annotation to the textbook contents under the title of "Outbreak of War and the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere" in the recently authorized Japanese high school history book for next year.

CSO: 4108/203

S. KOREA/FOREIGN RELATIONS

BRIEFS

JAPANESE TEXTBOOK ISSUE--Referring to whether the government will take an official action regarding the distortion of the history of aggression against Korea in school textbooks in Japan, a high-ranking official at the office of the prime minister on 24 July said that Japan's view of this issue is under review by the Education Ministry and that a government-level action will be taken sooner or later. He said: The timing of this action needs consideration. We should consider the fact that there is a trend in Japan for self-examination concerning the issue and a difference of views between the two countries over ROK-Japan economic cooperation. The official added: Japan might interpret our protest against the distortion of historical facts as a complaint about negotiations for ROK-Japan economic cooperation. If the Japanese people have a guilty conscience and the level of intelligence to reflect on history, this trend will increase. If Japan assumes a correct attitude, the issue will be settled. [Text] [SK260628 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean 25 Jul 82 p 2]

JAPANESE LOAN REPLY--The Foreign Ministry's working team in charge of the negotiations over Korea-Japan economic cooperation seemed to be disappointed and displeased with the Japanese counterproposal, which was conveyed by Japanese councillor Koto on the afternoon of 23 July and contained nothing different from the previous proposal set forth at the beginning of last May. Expressing his embarrassment at the Japanese counterproposal, Choe Tong-chin, director of the Asian Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, said: When I read some of the reports by Japanese dailies, I did not expect much, but I never anticipated the reply that came. The Japanese reply to our sincerity is too insincere. Another officer of the Foreign Ministry said: Despite foreign minister Yi's acceptance of the invitation and subsequent visit to Japan and regardless of diplomatic courtesy, the Japanese side sent us this reply. It is an unfriendly act, like backbiting. The officer expressed concern over the future, referring to the people's bad feeling over the question of Japanese history textbooks. Meanwhile, briefed on the results of the 23 July consultation with the Japanese side, Foreign Minister Yi Pom-sok canceled his annual leave that was to have begun on 24 July and visited acting premier Kim Sang-hyop. After briefing the acting premier on the results of the meeting, he called a meeting of officers and discussed measures to cope with the problem. [Text] [SK261234 Seoul KYONGHYANG SINMUN in Korean 24 Jul 82 p 2]

JAPANESE ON LOAN ISSUE--Since the response of the Japanese side to economic cooperation with Korea was insincere despite big concessions by the Korean side, the atmosphere at the Foreign Ministry was overflowing with a mixture of surging indignation and calm and control, since it is the office directly involved in the negotiations. An official at the Foreign Ministry said: If the Japanese believe that Korea should receive whatever funds Japan gives in light of Korea's difficult economic situation in the wake of the Chang loan scandal, the future of the two nations will be very dark. He declined to comment further. Another official noted that people often say Korea-Japan relations are close on the one hand and far apart on the other. If we travel to Japan via the West instead of the East, we have to go all around the globe. Japan would be the country farthest away. [Text] [SK251022 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean 25 Jul 82 p 2]

MEETING WITH SOCIALIST LEADER--On the morning of 23 July, Yi Chae-hyong, chairman of the Korean National Party [KNP], received in turn Madam Schmit, vice chairwoman of the Socialist International, and had a conversation with her. Chairman Yi told Madam Schmit: though it is difficult for us to enjoy freedom as the European people do because of our situation, we are making efforts to maximize freedom in specific circumstances. Saying that democratic socialism opposes not only the inconsistency of capitalism, but the infringement upon human rights by communism and its obliteration of human creativity, Madam Schmit stressed: We only urge social policy based upon humanitarianism. Meanwhile, KNP President Kim Chong-chol said: The Korean Peninsula was divided unilaterally by the big powers. He demanded that the Socialist International create a cooperative atmosphere in international society by understanding the situation facing Korea. [Text] [SK250126 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean 24 Jul 82 p 2]

CSO: 4108/203

S. KOREA/INTERNATIONAL COMMENTARY

PRC NUCLEAR WAR POTENTIAL VIEWED

SK221235 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 19 Jul 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Communist China's Nuclear War Potential"]

[Excerpts] In recent days, it has been frequently reported that the Communist China is moving toward strengthening its nuclear war capabilities, attracting our interest.

So as to cope with the threat of the Soviet Union, Communist China has reportedly deployed approximately 2 million military personnel along the Sino-Russian border. It is also said that Communist China is concentrating its efforts on developing conventional regular arms, modernizing the military organization and, especially, developing and increasing nuclear war capabilities.

In preparation against a Soviet attack, it is observed, Communist China has mapped out a dual defensive strategy of simultaneously modifying its conventional people's warfare strategy and using nuclear arms for its national defense. Communist China's strategy was revealed in a recent large-scale military exercise it waged in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, in the west of the country, on the assumption of using tactical nuclear weapons.

Speaking of Communist China's nuclear armament, it has been widely known that Communist China has stockpiled strategic nuclear arms, including intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM], and has deployed them to use in real warfare. Furthermore, the fact that Communist China might possess even tactical nuclear weapons further attracts our attention.

In May 1980, Communist China succeeded in test-firing an ICBM of "CSS4" type with a flying range of 13,000 kms from mainland China to the South Pacific area. This missile has the capability of striking targets in the western regions of the United States as well as the Soviet Union.

According to a report titled "Significance of the U.S.-Communist Chinese Military Cooperation" worked out by the foreign affairs committee of the U.S. Senate, Communist China is stockpiling two kinds of ICBM's with flying ranges of 7,000 to 13,000 kms, 60 intermediate range ballistic missiles and

about 50 medium range ballistic missiles, is developing "Red-6" type medium-range bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and possesses a 100,000-man strategic missile unit. Touching on the communist Chinese nuclear war capabilities, the report points out that though its nuclear arms are able to strike the United States and the Soviet Union, they pose no real threat to the United States, that because the whole area of the Soviet Union comes within the flying range of the communist Chinese missiles, the arms can do large-scale damage to Moscow, too, and that the Western bloc countries, including the ROK and Japan, are becoming the targets of such arms.

Such nuclear war capabilities of communist China are, of course, far inferior to those of the United States and the Soviet Union, especially the latter, which is seen as the number one enemy of communist China. To break from the Soviet-type weapon system in the 1950's, communist China has been enthusiastic about importing modern weapons technology from Western countries, including the United States. In reality, we can say that except for the United States, communist China is, at present, the only country in the Asian and Pacific region which can maintain the military balance against the formidable nuclear war capabilities of the Soviet Union.

In this regard, it can be estimated that the primary goal of the communist China's strengthening of its nuclear war capabilities is to warn the Soviet Union, which has deployed 1 million military personnel and SS-20 missiles along the Sino-Russian border and to demonstrate its will to deter or even repulse any Soviet attack with its own might and without any intervention of the United States.

We, who are under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, cannot but carefully watch various effects which the communist China's strengthening of its nuclear war capabilities might bring about.

CSO: 4108/203

N. KOREA/ECONOMY

SOVIET AID TO NORTH KOREA REPORTED

Seoul NAEWOE PRESS in Korean No 285, 25 Jun 82 pp woe 1S-5S

[Article: "Soviet Union Holds North Korean Puppets' Close Adhesion With Communist China in Check"]

[Text] (Seoul - Naewoe) Radio Moscow recently stepped up its campaign to remind North Korean puppets of the importance of their [Soviet Union's] economic aid to North Korean puppets, continuing to launch the propaganda of criticizing Communist China's policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Although such a phenomenon is simply one of the Soviet Union's habitual practices, one must pay attention to such a practice because it occurred while taking advantage of the occasion of the recent visit to Pyongyang of Communist China's high level military delegation headed by Geng Biao, minister of national defense.

Radio Moscow, in its broadcast on 12 June, 2 days prior to the arrival of Communist China's military delegation at Pyongyang, said: "The economic co-operation between the two [North Korea and the Soviet Union] is not only playing an important role in developing all fields of North Korea's national economy, but is also playing a significant role in fulfilling the bilateral agreements between the two countries"; and, following such a preface as this, the broadcast cited eight important plants and enterprises, the construction of which either has started or is scheduled to start soon, thanks to the Soviet Union's assistance. Thus [Radio Moscow] was bent on the propaganda of [the Soviet Union's] merit in [giving such aid.]

Such a campaign as this is a practice taken repeatedly by the Soviet Union at every opportunity. At the beginning of the year, Radio Moscow cited similar messages in the form of a "talk" of a high ranking officer of the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. And, on 17 March, on the occasion of the 33rd anniversary of the economic cultural agreement between the Soviet Union and the North Korean puppets, the same messages were emphasized in the propaganda launched by the Soviet Union.

Among the 8 plants to which the assistance was given, cited in the broadcast of 12 June, the biggest was the Pukch'ang Thermal Electric Power Plant—the expansion of the plant was projected by means of the assistance. This plant's current capacity is 1.4 million kw; and 45 percent of the electric power in

North Korea is being generated in this plant. When the construction of the No 15 and No 16 generators, whose capacity is 100,000 kw, is completed, a total of 1.6 million kw electricity will be generated, it is said. The Soviet Union went to the length of propagating by saying that this plant was "a scintillating model of the Soviet-Korean friendship." And, recently, it asserted: "The government of Korea conferred medals on 172 technicians of our country in a high citation of their services." Moreover, the Ch'ongjin Thermoelectric Power Plant is being built by means of their assistance, the propaganda said.

Thus the Soviet Union is giving assistance to the North Korean puppets for the construction of five power plants, including the Pukch'ang Thermoelectric Power Plant, the Sup'ung Power Plant (rehabilitation aid), and the Unggi and Pyongyang Thermopower plants. Over 60 percent of the electric power of the North Korean puppets is being generated through the Soviet Union's assistance, it is estimated.

The broadcast went on to reveal that a major recipient of this year's aid was the Pyongyang Battery Plant. The products of this plant will not only meet domestic demands, but will also be exported to the Soviet Union, the broadcast suggested. Then it emphasized that "the Soviet Union's economic and technical assistance took a comprehensive characteristic to the effect that not only the problems of designing, maintaining equipment, and dispatching technicians of this plant, but also those of training over 200 management cadres were resolved by means of the assistance." Thus the broadcast greatly exaggerated their influence on the economic and technical innovation of the North Korean puppets.

Meanwhile, major recipients of assistance include the following plants: the Aoji Chemical Plant, a synthetic ammonia plant for producing nitrogenous fertilizer, the Yongsong Bearing Plant (located in the Yongsong area, Pyongyang City); which produces over 200 kinds of bearings of sizes of 100,000 m/m to 680 m/m in diameter; the Pyongyang Small Electric Motor Plant (producing small home electrical appliances, including washing machines, refrigerators, and electric fans); and the facilities for producing rolled steel plates [some words unintelligible] in the Kimch'aek Iron Works (needed for producing tractors).

Greatly emphasizing [the importance of] their economic assistance to the North Korean puppets, Radio Moscow did not forget to repeat the statement which read: "Based on the principle of complete reciprocity, equality, and comradely support." This shows a careful attitude on the part of the Soviet Union to avoid impairment of the North Korean puppets' self-respect in which they set forth the slogan of "an independent economy by means of self-reliance" and turned it into an ideology.

In this way, while reminding the North Korean puppets of their influence in the economic field vis-a-vis their relationship with the North Korean puppets, Radio Moscow directly criticized Communist China for its policy toward the Korean Peninsula. This draws our attention in view of the fact that Communist China has in fact shown a delicate attitude in connection with this problem.

According to the broadcast of the 13th [sic] [of June], Communist China was reported to have taken the stand of opposing the unification of the Korean Peninsula. It asserted: "Asserting by words only that the U.S. forces in Korea should be withdrawn, while supporting North Korea's demands, [Communist China] is far from rendering cooperation in practice." Therefore, according to this broadcast's assertion, "the statements made by the leaders in Beijing to admire "thre great friendship" and "the militant friendship formed by means of blood" with the North Korean people have never fitted in with their realistic content."

Radio Moscow used to show a tendency to indirectly attempt to hold the relationship between Communist China and the North Korean puppets in check. But the recent broadcast cited above is rather exceptional in that it accused Communist China in such a crystal-clear statement, and in that it excited North Korea so much.

In this way, the Soviet Union has continuously attempted to remind one that its economic aid brought forth absolute influence on North Korea's economy. This represents an aspect showing a delicately competitive relationship between China and the Soviet Union, who surround the North Korean puppets in the crevices of 'the northern three-cornered relationship.' However, one must not overlook the aspect that reflects the nerve of the Soviet Union, which became acute on the occasion of the visit by Geng Biao, minister of national defense of Communist China, to North Korea.

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August 13, 1982